The right to freedom of expression is recognized as a human right under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and recognized in international human rights law in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 19 of the UDHR states that "everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference" and "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." The version of Article 19 in the ICCPR later amends this by stating that the exercise of these rights carries "special duties and responsibilities" and may "therefore be subject to certain restrictions" when necessary "[f]or respect of the rights or reputation of others" or "[f]or the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.

By the end of September, the American social media landscape will undergo a profound transformation, and we cannot yet map this new terrain. President Donald Trump’s executive orders targeting Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok and messaging and payments app WeChat are aimed at confronting China’s tech enabled illiberalism. This is a worthy goal, but his fitful approach undermines this objective.

Instead, the U.S. government should articulate and adhere to a country-neutral framework that looks beyond TikTok, understanding that actions today might (and ought to) set precedents for tomorrow. While Chinese platforms like TikTok currently present the most pressing use cases, they are only the preface to a much longer plot. Without a smarter approach, American policy will fail to successfully confront fast-growing, foreign-owned digital platforms with systemic data and information security vulnerabilities. Prior to any future executive orders aimed at Chinese companies, the president with input from the secretaries of state, commerce, and Treasury should articulate a set of principles-based criterion for this framework. This would help strengthen Washington’s broader efforts to offer an alternative to Beijing’s authoritarian, self-serving vision for the future of the internet.

TikTok has earned Washington’s scrutiny. American policymakers on both sides of the aisle are justifiably disturbed by its data security risks and Communist Party of China-influenced information control and censorship. TikTok’s parent company ByteDance’s vulnerability to Beijing’s cybersecurity and intelligence laws reifies fears of Chinese party-state leverage over companies and the individuals within them with admitted access to data collected from U.S. citizens. This consists of American consumer data collected by TikTok when they use the app. For instance, ByteDance could possibly obtain a teen TikTok user in Idaho’s internet protocol address, GPS location, posted content, images, contacts, keystroke rhythms, other personally identifiable information, and as of November 2019, even the unalterable “media access control” address unique to a device. Further, early concerns over TikTok as a vector for Beijing-sponsored disinformation or interference in U.S. domestic politics will be field-tested this election cycle.