which states that a natural action will always
occur in the same way, assuming identical condi-
tions; in fact, the agent considered by itself will
always act in the same way, but the effects may
vary with change in external conditions (East-
wood 1967).
Roger Bacon took Grosseteste’s methodologi-
cal convictions and developed them further. He
was the ï¬rst in the medieval period to invoke the
concept “law of natureâ€as a comprehensive,
unconditionally binding, and constitutive order-
ing of nature. His laws displayed a necessary,
causal connection between geometrical properties
and physical effects. He stressed the universal and
uniform aspects of these laws. Bacon formulated
laws of nature of several types, including the law
of the gravity of water and the laws of the multi-
plication of species (Kedar 2016). â€Wonderful,â€
Bacon declared, “is the power of this multiplica-
tion, since all things hidden and revealed happen
in accordance with its lawsâ€(Bacon Opus majus
4.4.3). His laws of multiplication (which included
the laws of refraction and reflection) qualify for
most of the properties of the modern conception of
laws, such as an if/then formulation, counterfac-
tual implications, independence of space-time,
explanatory power, and systematicity (Kedar and
Hon 2018). Most telling was Bacon’s treatment of
the problem of the water remaining in the clepsy-
dra in opposition to their natural inclination to
flow downward. Bacon did not employ the Aris-
totelian terminology of substance, species, genus,
and the four causes. Instead, he appealed to a
“universal natureâ€of the continuity of matter,
without which the general order of the world
machine would not hold on. The law of “universal
natureâ€overpowers the “particular natureâ€of the
water and provides nature with unity and order
(Schramm 1981). It may be the case that Bacon’s
concept of optical law had reached modern times
before Descartes (1596–1650), through the
Perspectiva of John Peckham (c. 1230–1292),
which Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) read (Ruby
1986). John Peckham was to draw on Bacon in
saying that in certain circumstances vision pro-
ceeds according to the “law of spiritsâ€(spirituum)
rather than the “law of diaphanousness.â€In the
ï¬fteenth century, Regiomontanus (1436–1476)
pointed to Bacon as an authority in optics and
Lorenzo Ghiberti (1378–1455) paraphrased the
Perspectiva in his Third Commentary without
acknowledgment. In the sixteenth century,
Francesco Maurolico (1494–1575), the astrono-
mer from Messina, drew directly on Bacon’s
Perspectiva in his Photismi de lumine et umbra
and so did Giambattista Della Porta (1535–1615)
in his De Refractione, even though he did not
provide references or mentioned Bacon by name
(Ruby 1986). All four used lex of optical phenom-
ena, and Regiomontanus (1436-76) used lex also
in astronomy and mathematics (Ruby 1986). The
signiï¬cant similarities between the concept of
laws held by Roger Bacon and by Francis Bacon
(1561–1626) and Robert Boyle (1627–1691),
such as the distinction between the laws of uni-
versal nature from laws of a particular nature,
strengthen the claim for historical continuity
(Steinle 1995).
Even though they did not bequeath any formu-
lation of speciï¬c laws, it is argued that medieval
nominalists-voluntarists, of which the most prom-
inent was William of Ockham, had an important
function in the historical emergence of the concept
of laws in the seventeenth century. Some goes
further to claim that a complete conception of
laws was in fact already there. The nominalist-
voluntarist thesis holds that the major influence of
Ockham and his successors was less on the con-
tent of the scientiï¬c ideas themselves than on the
new metaphysics and philosophy of nature which
they began and which was further developed by
the advocates of the new mechanical philosophy.
It was this philosophy of nature that provided a
context within which the idea of a law of nature
was both comprehensible and natural (Milton
1981). The metaphysics which Ockham and his
successors proposed was made of the following
tenets: there exists an inï¬nite gap between the
omnipotent God and the created world; every-
thing which exists is an individual –metaphysical
realism is to be rejected altogether; God governs
the world, not by means of intermediaries, but
directly, by regulating the motions of every single
body; creation, therefore, is radically contingent
(Milton 1981). From all this, it follows that God’s
rule of the universe is executed in a manner of
Laws of Nature 3